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Abstract—Weird machines—the computational models
accessible by exploiting security vulnerabilities—arise from
the difference between the model a programmer has
in her head of how her program should run and the
implementation that actually executes. Previous attempts to
reason about or identify weird machines have viewed these
models through the lens of formal computational structures
such as state machines and Turing machines. But because
programmers rarely think about programs in this way, it is
difficult to effectively apply insights about weird machines
to improve security.
We present a new view of weird machines based on
techniques from programming languages theory and secure
compilation. Instead of an underspecified model drawn
from a programmers’ head, we start with a program writ-
ten in a high-level source language that enforces security
properties by design. Instead of state machines to describe
computation, we use the well-defined semantics of this
source language and a target language, into which the
source program will be compiled. Weird machines are the
sets of behaviors that can be achieved by a compiled source
program in the target language that cannot be achieved in
the source language directly. That is, exploits are witnesses
to insecure compilation.
This paper develops a framework for characterizing
weird machines as insecure compilation, and illustrates the
framework with examples of common exploits. We study
the classes of security properties that exploits violate, the
compositionality of exploits in a compiler stack, and the
weird machines and mitigations that arise.
Index Terms—Exploits, weird machines, secure compila-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
Exploits serve an important role in security research:
they witnesses the insecurity of a system by causing it
to behave inappropriately. However, an exploit by itself
fails to answer many important questions about the sys-
tem under consideration. How severe is the vulnerability
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opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in
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the views of the United States Air Force and DARPA.
in question? Does it represent a new class of attacks,
or is it a member of a known class of attacks? Is the
vulnerability an implementation error, a design flaw, or
an emergent property of the entire system? Can it be re-
paired and if so, how effective is a proposed mitigation?
Without a systematic approach to understanding exploits,
it is difficult to evaluate the importance of any particular
vulnerability or to generalize lessons learned to improve
security more broadly.
In the exploit community, practitioners describe hack-
ing as an exercise in “programming the weird machine”
of a system. A weird machine is the latent computational
machine exposed by a vulnerable program that can be
repurposed by an attacker to achieve their goals [1, 2, 3].
One of the most stark examples of weird machines in
practice is return-oriented programming (ROP), where
attackers exploit a program by overwriting the stack with
a sequence of return addresses that invoke fragments of
the original binary to achieve a desired effect [4].
Despite the intuitive appeal of weird machines, it
has proven challenging to provide a formal definition
that can be consistently applied to a variety of systems
and vulnerabilities [5, 6]. Dullien [6] defines weird
behavior as the difference between two state machines—
an intended finite state machine (IFSM) corresponding
to the model that the programmer has in her head when
writing the program and an implementation that attempts
to realize the IFSM. A weird state in the implementation
is one that does not correspond to a state in the IFSM.
A weird machine is the collection of computations
reachable from a weird state.
But state machines obscure the abstractions present
in the source program, which might be enforced by
language features or data structures. Indeed, Bratus and
Shubina [3] argue that weird machines arise exactly
when an attack causes a program to encounter an unex-
pected program state by violating the program’s expected
abstractions. Furthermore, the state machine approach
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does not explain how the IFSM and the implementation
are related, or how to know if the implementation is
sound.
In the study of programming languages, the relation-
ship between a high-level representation of a program
and a low-level implementation is given as a compiler.
The field of secure compilation [7, 8, 9] studies when
and how security properties are preserved by a compiler.
Historically, secure compilation referred to a compiler
satisfying full abstraction, the property that two pro-
grams are equivalent in the source language if and only if
their compilations are equivalent in the target language.
If a compiler is fully abstract, attacks on the compiled
version of the program should only be as strong as
attacks on the original high-level version, and so it is suf-
ficient for a programmer to reason about security prop-
erties at the source code level, without worrying about
insecurity introduced during compilation. More recently,
researchers have proposed robust property preservation
as an alternative characterization of a compiler security
that says a compiler is secure if it preserves the security
of behaviors of source programs [9, 10].
Our contribution in this work is to provide a new
formal definition of weird machines based on secure
compilation and a framework for reasoning about pro-
grams, vulnerabilities, and exploits. We define the ex-
ploits of a vulnerable source-language component V
to be the target-language attacker contexts A that are
counterexamples to secure compilation between V and
its compilation V↓. Formally, the behavior of an exploit
linked with this compilation cannot be simulated by any
context in the source language. The weird machine of V
is the class of behaviors arising from exploits of V.1
With the framework that arises, we model a number
of weird machines and exploits including return-oriented
and data-oriented programming [4, 11], access control
in Java [7], information flow control [12], and timing
side-channel attacks (Sections II and III). We prove
that exploits are exactly the contexts that violate robust
properties of behaviors [9] and identify several other
classes of exploits that violate sub-classes of security
properties (Section III).
We prove that exploits propagate up and down a com-
piler stack under certain conditions, so exploits in a small
part of a compiler stack can be understood as exploits of
a larger system (Section IV). We show that our approach
1 Throughout the paper we use blue, sans-serif text to refer to meta-
variables and notations in the source language, orange, bold text for
meta-variables and notations in the target language, and black, italic
text for meta-variables and notations of either language. We suggest
viewing or printing the paper in color for maximum readability.
language Source Target
whole programs PS PT
behaviors bS ∈ BS bT ∈ BT
whole program semantics B(PS) ≜ bS B(PT) ≜ bT
components US UT
contexts CS CT
linking CS[US] ≜ PS CT[UT] ≜ PT
attacker A ∈ A ⊆ {CT}
compiler ↓SourceTarget (or just ↓)
behavior relation bS ↦ bT
whole programs PS ↓≜ PT
components US ↓≜ UT
contexts CS ↓≜ CT
modularity B(CS ↓ [US ↓]) = B(CS[US]↓)
Fig. 1: Summary and notation of the framework.
generalizes Dullien’s state machine formalization, but
focuses on the behavior of the attack rather than the
mechanism of the attack (Section V). For example, C
programs using undefined behavior in a safe way are
not considered exploits in our framework, but are in
the prior work. Finally, we discuss how our framework
can highlight the expressiveness of certain exploits, their
underlying causes, and their mitigations (Section VI).
II. MAIN IDEAS
In this section we develop a formal framework of
exploits and weird machines. This framework consid-
ers two programming languages—a source language
Source and a target language Target—connected via
a compiler ↓. The pieces of this framework, described
below, are summarized in Figure 1.
Behaviors, contexts and components: We assume each
language is associated with a set of behaviors B, which
we denote with the meta-variables b ∈ B. The behavior
of a whole program P , written B(P ), describes its
semantics. For example:
● In C, the behavior of a program P is a set of input-
output traces corresponding to possible executions
of the program.● In functional languages, the behavior of an expres-
sion is its value and/or termination behavior.● In SQL (Section II-B), the behavior of a query P
is a function from a relational database to the table
corresponding to the result of the query.
Frequently, but not always, the set of behaviors has the
form B = P(Trace), where Trace is a set of traces.
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In practice programs are often modular, making use
of external libraries or relying on input from untrusted
sources (e.g. a server accepting input or a program
relying on a config file). Exploits arise when some piece
of a program U , called a component, is linked with an
adversarial surrounding environment C, called a context.
This linking operation forms a whole program C[U].
● In C, a component is a compilation unit that is
linked with a context comprising other compilation
units (perhaps including a main procedure).● In Java, components and contexts are sets of classes
that refer to each other.● In functional languages, a component is an open
expression and a context is an expression with a
hole that can be filled with the component.● In languages with I/O, the context may also include
an environment that provides input to a standalone
program component.
The result of linking may not always be defined, but for
the sake of simplicity we assume that whenever C[U]
occurs in this paper, it is well-defined.
Compilers: A compiler maps programs in the source
language Source to programs in the target langauge
Target. For a whole source program PS we write PS ↓
for its compilation. We say that a compiler is modular
if compilation is also defined on source components
US and source contexts CS such that B(CS[US] ↓) =
B(CS ↓ [US ↓]). Unless otherwise specified, assume that
all the compilers occurring in this paper are modular.
Understanding the effect of compilation requires relat-
ing behaviors in the source language (bS) with behaviors
in the target language (bT); this relation is written
bS ↦ bT and pronounced “bS maps to bT”. When the
source and target behaviors are drawn from the same
set (BS = BT), this relation may just be equality, but
in general we will assume very little structure on the
relation itself. To see why, consider the following:
● ↦ need not be functional: Suppose the source
language has nondeterministic behaviors, written
bS1 ⊕ bS2 , and the target language does not, so that
bS1 ⊕ bS2 ↦ bT1 and bS1 ⊕ bS2 ↦ bT2 .● ↦ need not be well-defined on all inputs: in C (as in
Section II-E), the undefined behavior undef is not
related to any target behaviors: ∀bT.undef /↦ bT.● ↦ need not be injective: If the source language
has both boolean values and natural numbers and
the target language has only integers (as in Sec-
tion II-E), we will have both true↦ 1 and 1↦ 1.● ↦ need not be surjective: As above, if the source
language has booleans and natural numbers but no
Fig. 2: An attacker context A ∈ A is in the weird machine
of V if and only if there is no back-translated context
CS such that CS[V] behaves the same as A[V↓].
(negative) integers, then there is no bS such that
bS ↦ −1.
When the behaviors of the source and target language
each defined as a set of traces (BS = P(Trace S) andBT = P(Trace T)), then the relation bS ↦ bT can be
decomposed into a relation tS ↦ tT on traces (reusing
notation):
bS ↦ bT ⇐⇒(∀tS ∈ bS.∃tT ∈ bT.tS ↦ tT) ∧ (∀tT ∈ bT.∃tS ∈ bS.tS ↦ tT)
Attackers: A security exploit consists of two parts:
a vulnerable source component V and an attacking
target context A drawn from some set A. The set A
corresponds to the sorts of attacks being considered. For
example, in the case of data-oriented programming, A
may allow arbitrary writes of constants to memory but
cannot affect control flow. In the theoretical language
with I/O, A may be allowed to perform input/output with
the source component but not actually execute any code.
A. Exploits and weird machines
An attack A ∈ A invokes weird behavior if it interacts
with V↓ in a way that cannot be achieved in the source
language. In other words, a context is only an exploit if
there is no source context CS such that the behavior
of CS[V] is related to the behavior of A[V ↓]. This
relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.
Definition II.1. An exploit of a vulnerable source pro-
gram V is a target attacker context A ∈ A such that there
is no source context CS with B(CS[V])↦ B(A[V↓]).
ExploitA(V) ≜ {A ∈ A ∣ ¬∃CS.B(CS[V])↦ B(A[V↓])}
The weird machine of a vulnerable source program V
is the collection of behaviors arising from exploits of V.
WMA(V) ≜ {B(A[V↓]) ∣ A ∈ ExploitA(V)}
3
When A can be inferred from the context, we will
write Exploit(V) and WM(V) in place of ExploitA(V)
and WMA(V) respectively.
B. Example: SQL injection attack
Consider a source language made up of structured
SQL queries. The following program allows the user to
access information associated with a particular user id:
1 uid <- getIntegerInput();
2 SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserId = uid
This code is then compiled to a target language where
the SQL query is implemented as a string, processed by
an external call to a database.
1 uid <- getStringInput();
2 queryDB("SELECT * FROM Users \
3 WHERE UserId = " + uid);
A SQL injection attack interacts with the compiled
version of the code by setting the input uid to the string
"0 OR true". This results in a behavior (outputs the
entire Users table) that the source program (which only
ever outputs a single user’s information) cannot achieve.
C. Example: Finite memory
Consider a source language with unbounded heap size,
and a target language with a maximum heap of size n.
We define the behavior of programs in both the source
and the target languages to be the maximum size of the
heap used in execution of the program. The target lan-
guage can also throw an error, out_of_resources
if the program attempts to allocate more than n ref-
erences, and there is no source behavior such that
n ↦ out_of_resources. Thus, if V is a source
component such that A[V ↓] allocates more than n
memory references, then A ∈ Exploit(V).
D. Example: Access control
As recently as Java 8, Java had a security vulnerability
whereby attackers could gain access to a class C’s private
field if C also had an inner class that accessed the field. In
Java, inner classes have access to all of their outer class’s
private data, but the JVM does not have any notion of
inner classes. The result is that the private data accessed
by the inner class is exposed publicly, as illustrated by
Listing 1 (adapted from [7]). In this example, source
contexts of OuterClass cannot change the value of
flag, but target level contexts can modify it by invoking
the synthesized accessor access$002.
The Java compiler ensures that attacks of the form
A ↓ (where A is a source Java program) will not be
able to access this method, but there is nothing stopping
an attacker from manually constructing a JVM class
that uses it directly. This class can subvert any security
properties of the source program that rely on the privacy
of the flag field.
1 public class OuterClass {
2 private boolean flag = false;
3 private class InnerClass {
4 void setFlag(){
5 flag = true;
6 }
7 }
8 }
1 public class OuterClass
2 extends java.lang.Object{
3 public OuterClass();
4 Code: /* ... */
5 static boolean access$002(OuterClass, boolean);
6 Code:
7 0: aload_0
8 1: iload_1
9 2: dup_x1
10 3: putfield #1; //Field flag:Z
11 6: ireturn
12 }
13 public class OuterClass$InnerClass
14 extends java.lang.Object{ /* ... */ }
Listing 1: A Java program (top) uses an inner class that
when compiled (bottom) will expose private data.
E. Undefined behavior
Some of the most well-known exploits derive from the
use of undefined behavior in C. For example, accessing
memory outside of the bounds of an array is undefined
according to the C standard [13], which means that
the language provides no guarantees about the behavior
of a compiled program during an execution that would
have performed such an access. In practice, rather than
emitting code with an arbitrary behavior, a C compiler
will emit code with predictable (if surprising) behavior,
for example compiling an out-of-bounds read to either
1) silently read from memory outside of the bounds of
the array; 2) throw an error when such an out-of-bounds
access occurs; or 3) enter an infinite loop; etc. Given
a particular compiler, an exploit writer can observe the
choice made by the compiler (in practice, almost always
1) and use the actual behavior of the compiled code
for her own purposes. By understanding the compilation
strategies a compiler makes for undefined behaviors and
the layout of the stack, attackers can craft exploits from
syntactically valid but semantically undefined C code
fragments. That is, exploits of C programs V often have
the form A↓ where A is a C program that gives rise to
undefined behaviors when linked with V.
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1 void echo(void) {
2 char[64] buf;
3 gets(buf);
4 printf("%s\n", buf);
5 }
6
7 int main() {
8 while (1) { echo(); }
9 }
Listing 2: A program vulnerable to return-oriented pro-
gramming.
To formalize this, assume there is some C trace be-
havior undef ∈ Trace S. The C compiler CompCert [14]
in correct in the sense that, if undef ∉ B(PS), then tT ∈
B(PS ↓) implies that there is som tS ∈ B(PS) such that
tS ↦ tT. However, CompCert does not make any claims
about the behavior of PS ↓ when tS ∈ B(PS) = undef.
To account for undefined behavior, we say that whenever
undef ↦ tT, it must either be the case that tT = undef
or there is no undef ∈ Trace T, in which case there is
no such tT.
F. Example: Return-oriented programming
Consider the simple ‘echo’ C program in Listing 2.
If an attacker provides more than 64 characters to (the
compilation of) echo, the data will overflow onto the
rest of the stack, overwriting the return pointer. When
the program returns from echo, instead of returning to
the calling function, it will return to the new address
in the return pointer, either causing a segfault or con-
tinuing with some other code. By carefully choosing
which address to write to the return pointer and other
locations on the stack, an attacker can launch a return-
oriented programming attack on the program, executing
a malicious payload.
It is easy to see that return-oriented programming can
result in behaviors that were unachievable by a source
context, such as causing the program to launch a shell
or invoke other system calls. If the context linked with
a component can run arbitrary code, then this behavior
may not suffice to show the attack is an exploit, since the
source context could have achieved the same effect. Even
in this scenario, however, some uses of return-oriented
programming will be identified as exploits because they
use altered control flow to violate other abstractions in
the source program.
G. Exploits violate language abstractions
In order to identify security violations, we use the
source language semantics as an oracle for secure behav-
ior. That is, an attack is only an exploit if it violates some
assumptions or abstractions of the source language.
1 /* auth.h */
2 bool auth();
3 char guess[8];
1 /* auth.c */
2 #include "auth.h"
3
4 static char secret[8];
5
6 static void init_secret() {
7 strcpy(secret, "weird");
8 }
9
10 void auth() {
11 init_secret();
12 if (0 != strcmp(secret, guess)) {
13 printf("Wrong password: %s", guess);
14 exit(-1);
15 } else {
16 printf("Logged in");
17 }
18 }
Listing 3: Authentication function with constant secret.
1 /* main.c */
2 #include "auth.h"
3
4 void before() { /* provided by attacker */ }
5 void after() { /* provided by attacker */ }
6
7 int main() {
8 before();
9 auth();
10 after();
11 }
Listing 4: A class of attacker contexts for the authenti-
cation function.
For example, consider the C function auth in List-
ing 3 that implements an authentication mechanism using
the hard-coded password "weird". Suppose we wish to
consider the security of this function against an attacker
linking to it from a larger C program, modeled by the
class of attacker contexts given in Listing 4.
The attack in Listing 5 extracts the password us-
ing a carefully crafted input that writes its null ter-
minator outside of the guess array (into the first
element of the adjacent secret). But the null ter-
minator for guess is subsequently overwritten when
init_secret() copies "weird" to secret. Thus
the ”string” in guess is suffixed with the contents of
secret, which will be output on line 13, revealing the
secret: Wrong password: 12345678weird.
Perhaps unintuitively, this context would not be con-
sidered an exploit according to our definition, because
the context in Listing 6 exhibits the same behavior
according to the C semantics. The existence of the
constant value "weird" is not protected by a language-
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1 void before() { strcpy(guess, "12345678"); }
2 void after() { return; }
Listing 5: An attack that prints the password.
1 void before() { strcpy(guess, "1234567"); }
2 void after() { printf("8weird"); }
Listing 6: A context with the same behavior as Listing 5
in the source semantics.
level abstraction and so an attacker can easily simulate
the behavior of an exploit that accesses the password.
Suppose instead that the password was hidden by a
language-level abstraction, such as a different imple-
mentation of init_secret that loads the (possibly
different on each execution) secret from some external
source (e.g., an access-controlled configuration file). In
that case, the context in Listing 5 would be an exploit,
since according to the source-language semantics, no
context can access the static buffer secret or the static
function init_secret.
The security properties of such a component V can
be broken into two parts: 1) its security with respect to
source language contexts; and 2) its security with respect
to target language contexts. In general programmers
should take perspective 1 into account when writing
code and developing algorithms, since they are already in
the mindspace of the source language. But programmers
often don’t know the details of a compiler or target
language, so it is significantly harder to understand
perspective 2.
In Section III-D, we discuss an extension of our frame-
work that would identify the attack against Listing 3 as
an exploit by also considering attacks that violate code
confidentiality. This extended definition can account for
additional exploits under an attacker model where the
adversary is assumed not to have access to the program’s
source code, at the cost of increasing the difficulty of rea-
soning about program exploitability. However, even with
this extension, there are still programs that are intuitively
insecure but that our framework says are unexploitable,
such as a program that always stores user’s passwords in
plaintext, violating well-known security best practices.
III. ROBUST PROPERTY VIOLATION
One way to characterize classes of exploits is to con-
sider what security properties of a source program they
can violate. For example, return-oriented programming
attacks can change the the control-flow of a program,
while data-oriented programming attacks can only alter
the data that a program computes on. Similarly, timing
side channels may reveal confidential information, but
cannot directly change the execution of a program. In
general, showing that an attacker context violates a
property that holds of all source programs is sufficient
to show that it has invoked a weird behavior.
For a property B ⊆ BS of source behaviors, we write
B↓ for the set of target behaviors satisfying B:
B↓≜ {bT ∈ BT ∣ ∃bS ∈ B.bS ↦ bT} .
Lemma III.1. Let B ⊆ BS be a property of source
behaviors such that for all whole source programs PS,
B(PS) ∈ B. If V is a source component and A ∈ A
is a target context such that B(A[V ↓]) ∉ B ↓, then
A ∈ ExploitA(V).
Proof. Since B(A[V ↓]) ∉ B ↓, there is no source
behavior bS ∈ B such that bS ↦ B(A[V↓]); so there is
no context CS such that B(CS[V])↦ B(A[V↓]).
In fact, the violating property need not hold of all
source programs, but only those of the form CS[V].
Lemma III.2. Let V be a source component, and let
B ⊆ BS be a property of source behaviors such that for
all source contexts CS, it is the case that B(CS[V]) ∈ B.
If A ∈ A is an attack such that B(A[V ↓]) ∉ B ↓, then
A ∈ Exploit(V).
This result derives from the literature on robust prop-
erty preserving compilers [10, 9, 15]. A compiler sat-
isfies robust (hyper-) property preservation (RHP) if,
whenever a hyperproperty is preserved by a source pro-
gram, the compilation of the hyperproperty is preserved
by the compilation of the source program.2∀B ⊆ BS. ∀US. (∀CS. B(CS[US]) ∈ B)⇒(∀CT. B(CT[US ↓]) ∈ B↓) (RHP)
Abate et al. [9] also give a property-free characterization
of robust hyperproprety preservation:
Theorem III.3 (Abate et al. [9]). A compiler satisfies
RHP if and only if for all source components US and
target contexts CT, there exists a back-translated source
context CS such that B(CS[US])↦ B(CT[US ↓]).
This property-free characterization is exactly the nega-
tion of Definition II.1, so we can restate the result in
terms of exploits:
Theorem III.4. A compiler satisfies RHP if and only
if it has no exploits: for all source components US,
Exploit(US) = ∅.
2For a much deeper discussion of robust property preservation with
respect to the bhavior relation, see Abate et al. [15]; prior to that, it
was assumed that source and target behaviors were always equal.
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Lemma III.2 establishes one direction of this claim,
and we present the other for completeness:
Lemma III.5. If A ∈ Exploit(V), then there exists some
property B ⊆ BS such that B(A[V ↓]) ∉ B ↓ but for all
source contexts CS it is the case that B(CS[V]) ∈ B.
Proof. Let B be the property consisting of all behaviors
of the form B(CS[V]) for any source context CS, but
excluding behaviors of the form B(A[V↓]):
B = {bS ∣ bS /↦ B(A[V↓]) ∧ ∃CS.bS = B(CS[V])} .
Clearly B(A[V↓]) ∉ B↓. It then suffices to show that for
all source contexts CS, B(CS[V]) /↦ B(A[V↓]), which
follows directly from the fact that A ∈ Exploit(V).
A. Example: Information flow control
Consider a source language with information flow
control (IFC) labels H and L, where low-confidentiality
data L is allowed to flow to high-confidentiality data H,
but not vice versa. Suppose that the (big-step) operational
semantics of a source program c is written c ⊢ γ →∗ γ′,
where γ is a store of variables marked with an IFC label.
The behavior of a program c is a (partial) function on
configurations such that c ⊢ γ →∗ B(c)(γ).
If the source language enforces non-interference [12]
for c, it satisfies the following property: if c ⊢ γ1 →∗ γ2
and c ⊢ γ′1 →∗ γ′2 such that γ1∣L = γ′1∣L, then γ2∣L = γ′2∣L.
That is, if the public inputs to c are equal, then its public
outputs must also be equal.
If the IFC source language is compiled to a target
language with IFC, then any attack that violates non-
interference in the target language is an exploit.
B. Trace properties
As we saw in Section II, many languages characterize
behaviors as sets of input/output traces (B = P(Trace)),
and derive the behavior relation bS ↦ bT from an
underlying relation on traces tS ↦ tT. When this is the
case, we can distinguish hyperproperties H ⊆ P(Trace)
from trace properties pi ⊆ Trace.
A whole program P satisfies pi ⊆ Trace when t ∈
B(P ) implies t ∈ pi. For a source trace property pi ∈ BS,
we write pi↓∈ BT for
pi↓≜ {tT ∈ BT ∣ ∃tS ∈ pi.tS ↦ tT} .
A compiler satisfies robust trace property preservation
(RTP) when it preserves all source trace properties:∀pi ⊆ Trace S. ∀US. (∀CS. B(CS[US]) ⊆ pi)⇒(∀CT. B(CT[US ↓]) ⊆ pi↓)
(RTP)
Abate et al. [9] similarly give an equivalent property-
free characterization of RTP:
Theorem III.6 (Abate et al. [9]). A compiler satisfies
RTP if and only if for all source components US and
target contexts CT, if tT ∈ B(CT[US ↓]) then there exists
some source context CS and tS ∈ B(CS[US]) such that
tS ↦ tT.
Therefore, we can define a variant of Exploit(V)
corresponding to the violation of trace properties.
Definition III.7. A trace exploit of a vulnerable source
program V is a context A ∈ A that violates RTP:
TExploit(V) ≜ {A ∈ A ∣∃tT ∈ B(A[V↓]). ∀CS.∀tS ∈ B(CS[V]).tS /↦ tT}.
Theorem III.8. A ∈ TExploit(V) if and only if there
exists some trace property pi such that B(A[V↓]) ⊊ pi ↓
but for all source contexts CS, we have B(CS[V]) ⊆ pi.
Proof. Follows from theorem III.6.
Notice that TExploit(V) is a subset of Exploit(V).
Lemma III.9. If A ∈ TExploit(V) then A ∈ Exploit(V).
Proof. It suffices to show the contrapositive. Suppose
that A ∉ Exploit(V), meaning that there is some CS such
that B(CS[V]) ↦ B(A[V ↓]). Then tT ∈ B(A[US ↓])
implies there is some tS ∈ B(CS[V]) such that tS ↦ tT.
Therefore A ∉ TExploit(V).
However, Abate et al. show that these two classes are
not equivalent; there are exploits in Exploit(V) that do
not violate trace properties. A trace exploit must produce
a single trace that no source context could produce,
whereas a hyperproperty exploit may produce some set
b ⊆ Trace of traces such that no source context produces
precisely b.
C. Example: Side channel attacks
As an example of a hyperproperty exploit that is not
a trace exploit, consider the naive password checker in
Listing 7 that iterates over an input string, checking at
every index whether the password matches the character
at index i. In the source language, a context is a program
that interacts with this password checker and observes
whether a particular password has been accepted. In the
target language, attackers can also observe how long
each invocation of check_pass takes, and can use
that information to craft a timing attack to discover the
password in a linear number of calls to check_pass.
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1 bool check_pass(char* guess, size_t guess_len)
2 {
3 char *password = get_password();
4 if (strlen(password) != guess_len)
5 return false;
6
7 for (size_t i = 0; < guess_len; i++) {
8 if (guess[i] != password[i])
9 return false;
10 }
11
12 return true;
13 }
Listing 7: A password checker with a side-channel.
The attack proceeds as follows: First, the attacker
measures the response time of different length guesses to
determine the length of the password. Then, given a valid
prefix of the correct password (starting with the empty
string), the attacker determines the next character with d
calls to check_pass, where d is the number of char-
acters available. In particular, the attacker finds the char-
acter c such that check_pass(prefix + c + c)
takes the longest; this is the character that does not exit
the loop early when the first character c fails to match.
We say that a behavior B(CS[check_pass]) cor-
rectly guesses passwords if, under an initial configuration
γpass with the password pass, outputs false some
number of times, followed by true, followed by the
value of pass. We say that this behavior correctly
guesses passwords in linear time if it correctly guesses
passwords and also the number of occurrences of false
in the traces in bS is linear in the size of pass.
We argue that all source programs of the form
CS[check_pass] satisfy the hyperproperty that
B(CS[check_pass]) does not correctly guess pass-
words in linear time.
D. Full abstraction
Abate et al. [9] propose an entire hierarchy of other
preservation conditions—safety properties, subset-closed
hyperproperties, and relational hyperproperties among
them. Each of these correspond to a class of exploits
that violate these properties. We focus on just one of
them here—exploits that violate full abstraction.
A compiler satisfies full abstraction [16] if contextual
equivalences in the source language US1 ≅ US2 imply
US1 ↓≅ US2 ↓ and vice versa, where contextual equiv-
alence U1 ≅ U2 means ∀C. B(C[U1]) = B(C[U2]).
For years, full abstraction has been the goal of secure
compilers [17, 16, 7, 18, 19, 8], so it seems natural to
consider exploits that violate full abstraction.
Definition III.10. The full abstraction exploits of a
source program V consist of those attacker contexts A
that violate full abstraction:
FAExploitA(V) ≜{A ∈ A ∣ ∃U. U ≅ V∧ B(A[V↓]) ≠ B(A[U↓])}
Recall the authentication function in Listing 3 and
the attack given in Listing 5 that forces auth to print
its hard-coded secret value. The attack relies on the
relative addresses of the guess and secret global
variables. As discussed in Section II-G, this attack is not
a counterexample to RHP, since the attacker can achieve
the same result if they happen to know the secret already
(Listing 6).
However, we can show that this attack is in the set
FA Exploit by constructing a component contextually
equivalent to auth that has different behavior under
the attack. In particular, consider a C program similar
to auth but where the order of the declarations (and
subsequent addresses) of guess and secret have been
swapped. Clearly, we have V ≅ V′ for these two pro-
grams, since the address of secret cannot be observed
by a source-level context and so the two layouts cannot
be distinguished. However, the behavior of the attack on
the compilations of the two programs is different.
1 void main(void) {
2 int32_t x = 0xdeadc0de;
3 int32_t y = 0xabadf00d;
4 int64_t result = context(&x, &y);
5 printf("%lld\n", result);
6 }
7
8 int64_t context(int32_t *x, int32_t *y) {
9 return *((int64_t *)x);
10 }
Listing 8: A program with benign undefined bevahior.
While FAExploit is useful in that case, we argue
that not every attack that violates full abstraction
corresponds to an exploit in the informal sense
of the word. Consider the example program
fragment main and context context in Listing 8.
Assuming a particular compilation strategy, this
program has the same compiled behavior as the
program that replaces the body of context with
return ((uint32_t)*x << 32) + *y. This
modified program does not violate any hyperproperties
of C code and so is not a hyperproperty exploit.
However, it is a counter-example to full abstraction,
since it would behave differently for a contextually-
equivalent definition of main that switches the order of
the local variable declarations.
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After some debate, the authors decided that this and
similar examples of benign undefined behavior do not
match our informal intuition of exploits, but some read-
ers may disagree. In that case, they may wish to take
FAExploit (or some other variant) as their definition of
exploit, and many of the techniques developed in this
paper will still benefit them.
IV. COMPOSITIONALITY
In real languages, compilers are made up of sev-
eral transformations, passing from a source language
through sometimes dozens of intermediate languages
before reaching a final target language. In other cases,
compilers can be reused by various front-ends; compilers
for C, C++, and Java can target LLVM [20] and reuse
its compiler for optimizations and to target a variety of
instruction set architectures
If an exploit can be identified in one part of a compiler
stack, we would like to extend that result and claim it is
an exploit of the entire compiler. Since it is easier to rea-
son about a simple compiler transformation as opposed
to the entire compiler stack, this makes reasoning about
exploits more compositional.
Suppose we have three languages—a source language
L1, an intermediate language L2 , and a target language
L3. We write ↓12 for the compiler from L1 to L2 , ↓23 for
the compiler from L2 to L3, and ↓13 for the composition↓12 ↓23 . We write Exploit12 for the exploits that arise from
the compiler ↓12 , and similarly for Exploit23 and Exploit13.
Finally, we write ↦12 and ↦23 for the behavior relations,
and ↦13 for the relation
b1 ↦13 b3 ≜ ∃b2.b2 ↦23 b3 ∧ b1 ↦12 b2.
Unfortunately, the most general compositionality re-
sults are not true.
Proposition IV.1 (False).
1) If A2 ∈ Exploit12 (V1) then A2 ↓23∈ Exploit13(V1).
2) If A3 ∈ Exploit23(U1 ↓12 ) then A3 ∈ Exploit13(U1).
This proposition does not hold in general because it
does not assume anything about the non-exploited part
of the compiler. In the first case, if ↓23 is a constant map
(sends every component to the same program P3), then as
long as there is some source context with B(C1[V1])↦
B(P3), then we have A2 ↓23∉ Exploit13(V1). In the second
case if ↓12 miscompiles U1, but then ↓23 somehow rectifies
the mistake, then A3 ∉ Exploit13(U1).
However, if we make some assumptions about how
the secondary stages of the compilers behave, then we
can restore compositionality.
A. Correct compilers
A compiler is called correct for whole programs if
the behaviors of whole programs exactly match the
behaviors of their compiled versions [15]:∀PS. B(PS)↦ B(PS ↓)
(compiler correct for whole programs)
More generally, we say that a compiler is correct with
respect to a component US if the compiler preserves the
behavior of whole programs of the form CS[US].∀CS. B(CS[US])↦ B(CS ↓ [US ↓]).
(compiler correct for US)
B. Compositionality of hyperproperty exploits
We say behaviors are invertible if b1 ↦13 b3 implies
b2 ↦23 b3 holds exactly when b1 ↦12 b2 does.
b1 ↦13 b3 ⇒ (∀b2. b2 ↦23 b3 ⇐⇒ b1 ↦12 b2)
(invertibility)
Proposition IV.2. If ↓23 is correct with respect to V1 ↓13
and behaviors are invertible, then A2 ∈ Exploit12 (V1)
implies A2 ↓23∈ Exploit13(V1).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume there is
some L1 context C
1 such that B(C1[V1]) ↦13 B(A2 ↓23[V1 ↓13]). By the correctness of ↓23 , it is the case
that B(A2[V1 ↓12 ]) ↦23 B(A2 ↓23 [V1 ↓13]). Then
B(C1[V1]) ↦12 B(A2[V1 ↓12 ]) by invertibility; but this
contradicts A2 ∈ Exploit12 (V1).
Proposition IV.3. If ↓12 is correct with respect to U1
and behaviors are invertible, then A3 ∈ Exploit23(U1 ↓12 )
implies A3 ∈ Exploit13(U1).
Proof. Assume for contradiction there is some L1 con-
text C1 such that B(C1[U1]) ↦13 B(A3[U1 ↓13]). Cor-
rectness of ↓12 means B(C1[U1])↦12 B(C1 ↓12 [U1 ↓12 ]).
By invertibility, B(C1 ↓12 [U1 ↓12 ]) ↦23 B(A3[U1 ↓13]),
but this contradicts A3 ∈ Exploit23(U1 ↓12 ).
C. Compositionality of trace exploits
Trace exploits are more compositional than hyperprop-
erty exploits. Even if a compiler is not correct for whole
programs, it may still preserve traces, which means that
the behavior of a whole program PS is a subset of the
behavior of PS ↓.
Definition IV.4. A compiler preserves traces of whole
programs if, for all whole programs PS,∀tS ∈ B(PS).∃tT ∈ B(PS ↓).tS ↦ tT
(preservation for whole programs)
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A compiler preserves traces of a component US if it
preserves the traces of programs of the form CS[US]:
∀CS.∀tS ∈ B(CS[US]).∃tT ∈ B(CS ↓ [US ↓]).tS ↦ tT
(preservation with respect to US)
As with behaviors, we require that the trace relations
between L1, L2 , and L3 be invertible.
Definition IV.5. We say that the relation ↦ on traces is
invertible if, whenever t1 ↦13 t3, we have t1 ↦12 t2 if and
only if t2 ↦23 t3.
Proposition IV.6. If V1 is a component such that ↓12
preserves traces of V1 and the trace relation is in-
vertible, then A3 ∈ TExploit23(V1 ↓12 ) implies A3 ∈
TExploit13(V1).
Proof. Since A3 ∈ TExploit23(V1 ↓12 ), we know there is
some t3 ∈ B(A3[V1 ↓13]) such that for all L2 contexts
C2 and traces t2 ∈ B(C2[V1 ↓12 ]), we have t2 /↦23 t3. To
show A3 ∈ TExploit13(V1), it suffices to fix an L1 context
C1 and trace t1 ∈ B(C1[V1]), and show that t1 /↦13 t3.
By preservation of ↓12 , we know that there exists some
t2 ∈ B(C1 ↓12 [V1 ↓12 ]) such that t1 ↦12 t2. By invertibility
of the trace relation, we can conclude that t1 /↦13 t3.
Proposition IV.7. Let V1 be a component such that↓23 preserves traces of V1 ↓12 and the trace relation
is invertible. Then A2 ∈ TExploit12 (V1) implies A2 ↓23∈
TExploit13(V1).
Proof. Since A2 ∈ TExploit12 (V1), there exists some t2 ∈
B(A2[V1 ↓12 ]) such that, for all C1 and t1 ∈ B(C1[V1]),
we have t1 /↦12 t2. By preservation of ↓23 , there exists
some t3 ∈ B(A2 ↓23 [V1 ↓13]) such that t2 ↦23 t3. To
show A2 ↓23∈ TExploit13(V1), it suffices to fix C1 and
t1 ∈ B(C1[V1]) and show that t1 /↦13 t3. This follows
from the fact that the trace relation is invertible.
D. Example
Consider a compiler stack made up of four languages:
1) a simple high-level imperative language IMP with
natural number and boolean values; 2) a simple C-
like language ToyC with procedure calls and pointer
arithmetic; 3) an assembly-like language ToyA with an
explicitly managed stack; and 4) a model of hardware
ToyH that enables the user to observe side-channel in-
formation about a program. Each stage of the compiler
exposes different sorts of exploits: 1) The compiler from
IMP to ToyC enables data-oriented programming exploits
because it maps both booleans and natural numbers in
IMP to integers in ToyC. 2) The compiler from ToyC
to ToyA enables return-oriented programming exploits
because attackers can read from and write to return
pointers. 3) The compiler from ToyA to ToyH enables
side-channel attacks because attackers can observe tim-
ing information about program executions.
The details of each of these languages, and the exploits
between them, are given in Section A.
Lemma IV.8.
1) The compiler from IMP to ToyC preserves behaviors
of whole programs.
2) The compiler from ToyC to ToyA preserves behav-
iors of whole programs.
3) The compiler from ToyA to ToyH is correct for
whole programs.
Because of these correctness results and the fact
that the behavior relations are invertible, we have the
following compositionality results:
Corollary IV.9. Let A be a data-oriented programming
attack in ToyC and let UI be an IMP component. If A ∈
TExploitIMPToyC(UI) then A↓ToyCToyA ∈ TExploitIMPToyA(UI).
Corollary IV.10. Let A be a return-oriented program-
ming attack in ToyA and let UI be an IMP component. If
A ∈ TExploitToyC
ToyA
(UI ↓IMP
ToyC
) then A ∈ TExploitIMPToyC(UI).
Corollary IV.11. Let A be a return-oriented program-
ming attack in ToyA and let V be a ToyC component. If
A ∈ ExploitToyC
ToyA
(V) then A↓ToyA
ToyH
∈ ExploitToyC
ToyH
(V).
Notice that this is the only result that holds for
hyperproperties, not just trace properties, since ↓ToyA
ToyH
is
the only compiler correct for whole programs.
Corollary IV.12. Let AH be a side-channel attack
in ToyH and let V be a ToyC component. If A ∈
TExploitToy
A
ToyH
(V↓ToyC
ToyA
) then A ∈ TExploitToyC
ToyH
(V).
V. WEIRD BEHAVIORS AND WEIRD STATES
The definition of secure compilation helps us under-
stand when it is safe to link a compiled high-level com-
ponent V↓ with some target code that was not compiled
from the same source language. This is common practice
in modular compilers, as shared libraries may be written
in other languages like LLVM or assembly and compiled
separately to a common target library. We argue that this
linking operation is safe as long as the target context is
not an exploit—as long as it has behavior compatible
with some source language code. Therefore, even if the
target context does not correspond operationally to any
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source level code, it is safe as long as it corresponds
behaviorally.
This observation leads to some unexpected conse-
quences. Consider an attack against a C component
V of the form A ↓ for some source-level C context
A, where A[V] has some undefined behavior. The fact
that undef ∈ B(A[V]) does not necessarily mean that
A ↓∈ Exploit(V), since there might exist some other C
context CS such that B(CS[V]) ↦ B(A ↓ [V ↓]). This
is the case with Listing 8 discussed in Section III-D.
The focus on the behavior of an attack rather than the
mechanism of an attack distinguishes us from prior work
that seeks to understand exploits, such as Szekeres et al.’s
survey of memory corruption exploit techniques [21]
and Dullien’s characterization of weird machines [6],
where any behavior that goes beyond the footprint of the
execution of a well-formed source program is considered
an exploit. Dullien characterizes weird machines as the
behaviors arising from weird states in a finite state
machine (FSM). In that setting, programs are emulators
of finite state machines; the intended finite state machine
(IFSM) is the idealized machine the programmer has in
her head of what the program should do, and the im-
plementation, called the CPU, is an FSM containing the
low-level states that correspond to an implementation. A
weird state is one that is present in the implementation
but does not correspond to a state in the IFSM.
A. Weird state machines
Before discussing its relationship to our framework,
we outline Dullien’s formalism and map it to our core
definitions. A finite state machine3 (FSM) is a 5-tuple(Q ,Σ, δ, q0,QA) where Q is a set of states, Σ is an
input alphabet, δ is a transition relation, q0 ∈ Q is the
starting state, and QA ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
We write q1
s→ q2 for (q1, s, q2) ∈ δ. The behavior of a
state q ∈ Q is a pair of sets (X1,X2) where X1 is the
set of strings that could have led the FSM to the state q ,
and X2 is the set of strings that would be accepted by
the FSM starting from q .
B(q[FSM ]) = ({s ∣ q0 s→∗ q} ,{s ∣ ∃q ′ ∈ QA.q s→∗ q ′})
In Dullien’s presentation the IFSM has the form
IFSM ≜ (QIFSM,Σ, δ,qS0 ,QA), and the implementation
has the form CPU ≜ (QCPU,Σ, δ,qT0 ,QA). He also
asserts that there is a representation map γ ∶ QIFSM →P(QCPU) relating states of the IFSM to sets of states of
3Dullien’s presentation also considers transducers, but here we
restrict our attention to ordinary FSMs. We expect the results to carry
over for transducers.
the implementation. Dullien imposes very little structure
onto this representation map.
A CPU state is called sane (qT ∈ QSane) if qT is in
the image of γ, and it is called transitory (qTt ∈ QTrans)
if it is a benign step between sane states introduced by
the implementation:
● there exist states qS1 ,qS2 ∈ QIFSM and s ∈ Σ such that
qS1
s→ qS2 ;● there exist states qT1 ∈ γ(qS1) and qT2 ∈ γ(qS2) such
that qT1 →∗ qTt →∗ qT2 such that● no state in this sequence is in the image of γ; and● all sequences of transitions from qTt lead to qT2 .
Finally, a state is called weird (qTw ∈ QWeird) if it is
neither sane nor transitory.
B. Reframing Dullien’s presentation
To map Dullien’s presentation onto our own, we take
the source and target languages to both be collections of
FSMs, and program components to be particular finite
state machines. A context is a state in the FSM, so a
whole program is an FSM along with an initial state.
Notice that we do not have a compiler between
the source and target languages per se, but instead
we have an implementation relation corresponding to
the representation map γ between the IFSM and the
implementations. We write this relation CPU ∈ IFSM ↓
as opposed to CPU = IFSM ↓, and we do not lose
anything from the change of perspective.
We say that γ respects behaviors if, whenever qS ∈
QIFSM and qT ∈ QCPU such that B(qS[IFSM]) ↦
B(qT[CPU]), it is the case that qT is either sane or
transitory. This property is not required in Dullien’s pre-
sentation, but we argue that if a weird state has the same
behavior as an intended state, the representation map
should not consider it weird. This does not imply that the
compiler is necessarily correct, since the representation
map could also map qS to some inequivalent states.
Theorem V.1. If γ respects behaviors and qTw ∈ QWeird
is a weird state, then qTw ∈ Exploit(IFSM).
Importantly, the definition of exploits used in this
paper includes weird machines that are not included in
Dullien’s version. Suppose there is a transition qT1
s→ qT2
between two sane states in CPU (meaning that there
exist IFSM states qSi such that q
T
i ∈ γ(qSi )) but there
is no transition qS1
s→ qS2 in the IFSM. This would
not be considered an exploit in Dullien’s definition,
because there are no weird states involved, but the
implementation clearly behaves in a way not intended
by the IFSM.
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VI. TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING EXPLOITS
Ultimately, the reason why we are studying exploits is
to make software systems more secure. In this section we
sketch ways in which future work could make inroads
towards understanding exploits and weird machines at a
deeper level.
A. What vulnerabilities exist?
First, we can use this framework to ask: given a
particular attacker class or set of language features, what
kinds of vulnerabilities exist? As a concrete example,
consider the first stage of the compiler from Section IV,
which compiles a simple imperative language IMP to
a C-like language ToyC. The IMP language has natural
number and boolean values, arithmetic operations, if and
while statements, and an OUTPUT x statement that
emits a value to an output trace. The ToyC language
extends these features with procedure calls, integer and
pointer values, and pointer arithmetic.
The fact that natural numbers and booleans in IMP
are both represented as integers in ToyC means that
attackers can violate the data structure abstractions in
IMP. Even a simple attacker class A in ToyC with no
control flow or output capabilities can result in data-
oriented programming vulnerabilities [22, 23].
In the compiler, components in IMP are compiled
to a procedure declaration hole(Ð→xi ; .){c} in ToyC. An
attacker context A ∈ A is a procedure called main that
can invoke the component as follows:
A ∶∶= main(Ð→xi ;Ð→yj ){a} (ToyC DOP attacks)
a ∶∶= x ∶= e;a ∣ hole(x1, .. , xn)
That is, the attacker context can only initialize arguments
provided to a compiled IMP program.
Even though the set of attacker contexts A does
not give access to the output trace, an attacker can
use a weird machine to output negative numbers using
the vulnerable source-level component OUTPUT x . In
particular, for any i < 0, the context x ∶= i;hole(x) is
an exploit of OUTPUT x , and it is possible to classify
the entire set of weird machines of OUTPUT x :
WMA(OUTPUT x) = {i ∣ i < 0}
This property can be extended to all weird machines
between IMP and ToyC.
Theorem VI.1. If an attacker context A ∈ A causes
UI ↓ to output negative numbers—if there is some trace
tT ∈ B(A[UI ↓]) containing a negative number—then A ∈
TExploitA(UI).
Proof. By theorem III.8, it suffices to show that, for all
IMP whole programs PI, if tT ∈ B(PI) and tS ∈ BS
contains negative numbers, then tT /↦ tS; this follows
from the definition of ↦.
B. How powerful is a vulnerability?
Understanding the class of weird machines WMA(V)
associated with a vulnerability helps us understand that
vulnerability’s strength. For example, a vulnerability
with hyperproperty exploits may be less powerful but
harder to detect than a vulnerability with trace exploits.
As another example, Hu et al. [23] show that data-
oriented programming is Turing complete given a large
enough set of entry points into the source component.
Restated in our framework, given an attacker class A and
a vulnerable source program with enough entry points,
the class WMA(V) is Turing complete.
However, Turing completeness is not the ultimate goal
of attackers; their goal is to easily and efficiently program
their attacks. Bratus and Shubina [3] have proposed that
we should instead ask if a set of attacks is compositional:
can the class WMA(V) be composed out of smaller,
easier-to-understand classes WMA1(V), . . . ,WMAn (V)?
If a vulnerability is compositional in this way, it is
especially susceptible to attacks, since attacks can then
be programmed rather than hand crafted.
C. What mitigations are effective?
Finally, by characterizing exploits we make it possible
reason about the effectiveness of different mitigation
strategies. Returning to the exploits of OUTPUT x ,
a programmer may wish to insert dynamic checks
to eliminate the possibility of exploits. For example,
the programmer or compiler could replace occurrences
of OUTPUT x in an IMP program with if x ≥
0 then OUTPUT x else SKIP. These two programs
are equivalent in IMP, but their compiled versions are
inequivalent in ToyC. However, this program still has a
non-empty weird machine, since the compiled machine
admits the behavior with an empty output trace but the
IMP program always emits an output.
WMA(if x ≥ 0 then OUTPUT x else SKIP) = {}.
If the else branch of the dynamic check is replaced
with the statement OUTPUT 0, then the resulting pro-
gram will have no exploits, since the behavior of all
target contexts will be simulatable by some IMP context.
WMA(if x ≥ 0 then OUTPUT x else OUTPUT 0)= ∅.
Although we are illustrating these mitigations with an
extremely simple example, prior work has shown that se-
cure compilation techniques can be used to reason about
mitigations that protect against more realistic exploits,
such as address space layout randomization [19].
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VII. RELATED WORK
A. Weird machines
The idea of a “weird machine” was introduced by
Sergey Bratus to connect the act of exploitation with
programming [1] and further developed by the LangSec
research community as a way to understand the causes
of computer insecurity [2]. In addition to using these
ideas to describe existing exploitation techniques such
as return-oriented programming [4] and heap feng
shui [24], researchers have identified weird machines
in a variety of systems including DWARF exception
handling data [25], the ELF executable format [26], and
embedded system interrupt handlers [27]. A common
approach to demonstrating the generality of weird ma-
chines and exploit techniques such as return-oriented
programming [4], data-oriented programming [23], and
counterfeit object-oriented programming [28] is to show
that the computations they enable are Turing complete.
Bratus and Shubina [3] argue the necessity of a
theory of weird machines and suggest a model relating
two abstraction levels of a program. Using the theory
discussed in Section V, Dullien [6] uses weird machines
to reason about the exploitability of different program
implementations. His work builds on a transducer model
of weird machines introduced by Vanegue [5].
B. Secure compilation and exploits
Abadi [7] introduced full abstraction as a security
criterion for compilation. Researchers have studied the
development of secure compilers for a variety of source
and target languages, and an excellent survey is given
by Patrignani et al. [8].
Kennedy [29] uses full abstraction to examine security
problems in the .NET programming model and propose
fixes, and Abadi and Plotkin [19] use full abstraction to
prove the effectiveness of address space layout random-
ization as a security mitigation. Erlingsson [30] suggests
many vulnerabilities stem from the lack of secure com-
pilation and discusses how mitigation strategies seek to
maintain certain properties of high-level languages.
Patrignani and Garg [10] describe several shortcom-
ings of full abstraction as a definition of secure compila-
tion and introduce property preservation as an alternative
definition. Abate et al. [9] build on this work to explore
a hierarchy of robust property preservation definitions,
which Abate et al. [15] later extend to support languages
whose source and target behaviors differ. We describe the
relationship between our framework and this hierarchy
in Section III-D.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a framework for reasoning about
weird machines as insecure compilation. We define ex-
ploits as attacks that behave in ways inaccessible in the
source language, and show how examples of common
exploits fit into our framework. We draw on prior
work about secure compilation to prove that exploits
always violate properties of source language behaviors,
and distinguish between different classes of properties,
such as hyperproperties and trace properties. We show
how exploits compose through a compiler stack, and
compare our approach to prior work by Dullien [6] that
characterizes exploits by the states they invoke rather
than the behavior they produce.
We draw heavily on programming language tech-
niques rather than state machine formalisms, making
it possible to reason directly about the behavior of
programs and compilation and eliminating the need to
manually construct a model of the relationship between
an implementation and its intended behavior.
Though we use of the theory of secure compilation,
our focus is quite different from that in the literature.
Most existing work attempts to construct secure compil-
ers; we take for granted that industrial compilers fall
short of that and study the repercussions. This may
appear cynical, but ultimately we hope that studying
exploits leads to a future with fewer and fewer of them.
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APPENDIX
[Examples]
In this section we describe a compiler stack for a high-
level imperative language IMP with natural numbers and
boolean values. This language is first compiled to a
C-like language ToyC with procedure calls and pointer
arithmetic, then to a toy assembly language ToyA with
an explicitly managed stack. ToyA is implemented in a
model of hardware, ToyH, in which users can observe
the timing information of ToyA programs. Each stage in
this compilation chain exposes different weird machines.
The languages and exploits described here are also
implemented in PLT Redex, made available as ancillary
files on arXiv.
A. IMP
The first language on the compiler stack is IMP, a
simple imperative language with natural numbers and
boolean expressions. An IMP program is a command—
a sequence of assignments, control flow, and outputs.
e ∶∶= x ∣ b ∈ Bool ∣ n ∈ Nat ∣ e ⊛ e (IMP expressions)⊛ ∶∶= + ∣ × ∣<∣==∣ ∧ ∣ ∨ (binary operations)
c ∶∶= x ∶= e ∣ OUTPUT e ∣ SKIP ∣ c; c∣ if e then c else c ∣ while e do c
(IMP commands)
The operational semantics of IMP is given as a judgment
c/σ t→ c′/σ′, where:
σ ∶∶= x ↦ v ∣ σ1, .. , σn (IMP store)
t ∶∶= ⋅ ∣ v, t (IMP trace)
v ∶∶= b ∈ Bool ∣ n ∈ Nat (IMP values)
We write c/σ /→ when c/σ is a stuck configuration that
cannot take a step, and we write →∗ for the transitive
closure of →. Finally, we write c/σ ⇓ t when there exists
some stuck state c′/σ′ such that c/σ t→∗ c′/σ′.
Weird machine meta-variables: A whole program
in IMP is a command c, and the behavior of such a
program is the set containing the output traces obtained
by instantiating the free variables of c. A component
in IMP is a command annotated by (a superset of) the
free variables that occur in it. A context is a command
with a hole in it; linking a context with a component
fills the hole with the component, and is only defined
when the annotation of the component matches the
annotation of the hole. The annotations will be important
for compilation.
PI ∶∶= c (IMP whole program)
UI ∶∶= (c,Ð→xi ) (IMP component)
CI ∶∶= ◻Ð→xi ∣ CI; c ∣ c; CI∣ if e then CI else c ∣ if e then c else CI∣ while e do CI (IMP context)
B. ToyC
We implement IMP by compiling it to a C-like lan-
guage called ToyC, where natural numbers and booleans
are both implemented as integers. Expressions in ToyC
consist of integers, unary and binary operations, and
pointers. Pointers are represented as l-values, `v , which
are either variables or pointer dereferences.
e ∶∶= x ∣ i ∣ e1 ⊛ e2 ∣NULL ∣ ∗e ∣ &`v (ToyC expressions)
`v ∶∶= x ∣ ∗`v (ToyC l-values)
Expressions can be assigned types τ–either simple types
(integers and pointers) or arrays of simple types.
τ ∶∶= σ ∣ σ[n] (ToyC types)
σ ∶∶= Int ∣ ∗τ (ToyC simple types)
Commands in ToyC are similar to those in IMP with
the addition of procedure calls p(e1, .. ,en). Assignment
statements are extended from variables to l-values.
c ∶∶= p(e1, .. ,en) ∣ `v ∶= e ∣ OUTPUT e ∣ SKIP ∣ c; c∣if e then c else c ∣ while e do c (ToyC commands)
A global store G is a list of procedure declarations,
which map procedure names p to commands c while
specifying the types of their arguments as well as any
local variables used in the procedure. Note that argu-
ments to procedures must all have simple types.
pd ∶∶= p(ÐÐÐ→xi ∶ σi ;ÐÐÐ→yj ∶ τ j ){c} (ToyC procedure declaration)
G ∶∶= {pd1, .. ,pdn} (ToyC global store)
The language is “C-like” in that it respects the call
structure of C and has pointer arithmetic, but of course it
differs from C in many ways. For one, ToyC will throw
an error when it reaches undefined behavior, unlike C,
which may execute any behavior (see Section II-E).
Weird machine meta-variables: A whole program
in ToyC is a global store G such that (1) there is a
function called main, (2) no two functions have the
same name, and (3) every procedure name p(e1, .. , en)
occurring in G has a corresponding procedure declara-
tion. Components US and contexts CS correspond to
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stores G satisfying condition (2), but not necessarily
(1) or (3). Linking a component with a context simply
concatenates the two stores.
PS ∶∶= G such that main ∈ dom(G)
(ToyC whole program)
US ∶∶= G (ToyC component)
CS ∶∶= G (ToyC context)
The behavior of a whole program is the set of traces
that invocations of main can give rise to.
C. Compiler from IMP to ToyC.
The compiler from IMP to ToyC maps IMP commands
c to ToyC commands ≪ c ≫, and then to procedure
declarations main(Ð→xi ; .){≪c≫} where Ð→xi are the free
variables used in c. The full compiler is implemented in
the PLT Redex model.
The behavior relation relates boolean/natural number
traces in IMP to their corresponding integer traces in
ToyC; we define t↓ so that t↦ t↓:
.↓ ≜ ⋅
true, t↓ ≜ 1, t↓ false, t↓ ≜ 0, t↓n, t↓ ≜ n, t↓
Lemma A.1. The compiler from IMP to ToyC is not
correct for whole programs.
Proof. Consider the whole program x ∶=
1;if x then OUTPUT true else OUTPUT false.
This is ill-typed in IMP, so its output trace is empty.
But when compiled to ToyA there is no such mismatch
between booleans and numbers, so it will execute
successfully and output true↓= 1.
However, the compiler does preserve the traces of
whole programs (Section IV-C):
Lemma A.2. If t ∈ B(PI) then t↓∈ B(PI ↓).
Proof. If t ∈ B(PI) then there is some store σ such
that PI/σ ⇓ t. But then the values of that store can be
converted to inputs to the compiled main procedure of
PI ↓, which will produce the same trace in ToyC.
D. Data-oriented programming with IMP and ToyC
It is impossible to write an IMP program that performs
natural number division, which requires subtraction.
However, it is possible to use data-oriented programming
on a benign-looking IMP component to implement this
behavior. Consider the following IMP component:
J ≜ OUTPUT x
OUTPUT y
r ∶= y;
d ∶= 0;
while x ≤ r do { r ∶= r + a
x ∶= x + b
d ∶= d + 1};
OUTPUT d;
OUTPUT r;
In IMP, J will terminate either if x is initially greater
than r, or if b, the amount by which x is increasing, is
more than a, the amount by which r is increasing. The
counter d tracks the number of iterations the loop takes.
The behavior of J in IMP will always output the trace
x, y, d, r such that r ≥ y; this is the trace property by
which we will measure weirdness.
An attacker in ToyC can manipulate the arguments to
J to implement division (which will output x, y, d, r such
that y = dx + r and r < x) as follows:
A ≜ main(x, y;a, b, d, r){a ∶= −x; b ∶= 0;d ∶= 0; r ∶= 0;
hole(x, y, d, r, a, b)}
To check that A ∈WM(J), it suffices to observe some
trace in B(A[J↓]) that outputs x, y, d, r such that r < y;
this is obtained with main(3,4), which outputs 3,4,1,2.
This example is implemented in PLT Redex (the
program dop-vulnerable in toyc.rkt).
E. Toy Assembly
In the toy assembly language ToyA, statements as well
as objects are stored in memory. Control flow is limited
to procedure calls and conditional jumps, and procedures
must explicitly invoke RETURN to return to their calling
function. The command HALT halts the computation.
c ∶∶= p(e1, .. , en) ∣ RETURN ∣ HALT ∣ `v ∶= e ∣ OUTPUT e∣ SKIP ∣ JMPZ e i (ToyA commands)
Expressions in ToyA are identical to those in ToyC.
Memory in ToyA is a map from integers to objects,
where objects are either values or statements of the form
p ⊳ c where p is a procedure name.
M ∶∶= ∅ ∣ M, i↦ oT (ToyA memory)
oT ∶∶= v ∣ p ⊳ c (ToyA objects)
v ∶∶= i (ToyA values)
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Control flow in ToyA is managed by the program counter
PC, a regular pointer into memory, and the stack is
managed by the stack pointer SP.
Each procedure is associated with a frame, which
maps variables to offsets at which the variables occur
with respect to the stack pointer. Frames distinguish vari-
ables from arrays, which are also associated with their
length. Procedure declarations map procedure names to
their entry point as a program counter, as well as their
associated stack frame. A global store is just a list of
procedure declarations.
F ∶∶= [ ] ∣ var x@n ∣ array x@n1(n2) (ToyA frame)
pd ∶∶= p(PC){F} (ToyA procedure declaration)
G ∶∶= {pd1, .. ,pdn} (ToyA global store)
Weird machine meta-variables: A whole program
in ToyA is a configuration < PC; SP;M > along with
a global store G. A component in ToyA is a global
store along with a memory fragment storing instructions.
A context consists of a program counter, stack pointer,
and another memory fragment that can contain both
initial memory and further instructions. The two disjoint
memory fragments are merged during linking.
PT ∶∶=G ⊢< PC;SP;M > (ToyA whole program)
UT ∶∶=G ⊢M (ToyA component)
CT ∶∶=< PC;SP;M > (ToyA context)< PC;SP;M0 > [G ⊢M1] ≜G ⊢< PC;SP;M0,M1 >
(ToyA linking)
The behavior of a whole program is the set of output
traces it can produce, ending in a HALT instruction.
F. Compiler from ToyC to ToyA
The compiler from ToyC to ToyA maps a ToyC com-
mand c to a memory containing instruction pointers,
which is merged with the ToyC memory, which is layed
out according to the ToyC stack.
Like the IMP compiler, the ToyC compiler preserves
the traces of whole programs:
Theorem A.3. Let PS be a whole program in ToyC. If
tS ∈ B(PS) then there exists some tT such that tS ↦ tT
and tT ∈ B(PS ↓).
The compiler is not correct for all whole programs
because there are ToyC programs that are undefined in
ToyC (such as those containing buffer overflows) but
whose compiled versions do successfully execute.
G. Return-oriented programming
In this section, we consider return-oriented program-
ming attacks where, by carefully crafting the input to
a program, we can manipulate the program counter and
redirect it to malicious code. The attacker can provide
1 void vulnerable (int* args, int len) {
2 int[2] p;
3 while (len > 0) {
4 *p = *args;
5 p += 1;
6 args += 1;
7 len -= 1;
8 }
9 }
10 void store (int* p) {
11 p = 42;
12 }
13 void print (int* p) {
14 output *p;
15 }
Listing 9: A program vulnerable to return-oriented pro-
gramming
1 vulnerable(
2 { sp0-15 /* desired stack pointer
3 * on return from 'store' */
4 , pc0 + 17 /* address of 'output *p'
5 * within 'print' */
6 , sp0-6; /* target value of 'p' on iteration
7 * that writes to 'p' */
8 , 3; /* target value of 'len' on iteration
9 * that writes to 'len' */
10 , sp0-15; /* desired stack pointer on return
11 * from 'vulnerable' */
12 , pc0+15; /* address of '*p = 42'
13 * within 'store' */
14 }, 6 ) /* value of len */
Listing 10: Attack that causes vulnerable to loop,
printing 42 on each iteration. Here, sp0 refers to the
initial address of the stack pointer, and pc0 refers to
the initial address of the program counter
arbitrary inputs to the ToyC component, but cannot
execute its own code.
Consider the ToyC component in Listing 9 consisting
of the procedures vulnerable, store, and print.
In ToyC, vulnerable is only defined when len is 0
or 1, since larger lengths would cause p to overflow.
The attack in Listing 10 passes an array of length 6
to vulnerable that it to loop indefinitely, outputting
42 each time. Since there is no context that results in an
infinite loop according to the source semantics, this is an
exploit. The example is implemented in the PLT Redex
model (the program rop-modular in toya.rkt),
and we briefly sketch its execution here.
The attack causes 6 iterations of the loop in
vulnerable to be executed. By the end of these
six iterations, the function vulnerable will return to
the program counter recorded at index SP0 − 9, which
will have been overwritten by the loop to point to the
instruction ∗p ∶= 42 in store. Next, the computation
will return from the function store to the program
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counter recorded at index SP0−13, which will have been
overwritten to point to the instruction OUTPUT(∗p)
in print; this will output the constant 42. Finally,
as the computation returns from the function print,
the program counter will continue to be directed to the
instruction OUTPUT(∗p), so the program will continue
to loop forever, printing out 42 at each step.
H. ToyH
As the final layer in our compiler stack, we consider a
hypothetical physical machine (ToyH for toy hardware)
on which toy assembly code is implemented. Programs
in this machine are sequences of invocations of assembly
programs. The language is similar to IMP with booleans
and integers, with the addition of a command (x1, x2) ∶=
get_info(PT) that executes the ToyA program PT and
stores both the output trace of the program and the
number of steps it took to execute in the value x. That
is, a programmer of ToyA can execute ToyA programs
and use the timing information to make decisions.
e ∶∶= x ∣ b ∈ Bool ∣ i ∈ Int ∣ e1 ⊛ e2 (ToyH expressions)
c ∶∶= x ∶= e ∣ (x1, x2) ∶= get_info(PT) ∣ OUTPUT e∣ SKIP ∣ c1; c2 ∣ if e then c1 else c0∣ while e do c (ToyH commands)
A component in ToyH is just a component in ToyA, and
an attacking context is a ToyH program with a hole for
such ToyA components.
PH ∶∶= c (ToyH whole program)
UH ∶∶= UT (ToyH components)
AH ∶∶= (x1, x2) ∶= get_info(CT[◻]) ∣ AH; c ∣ c;AH∣ if e then AH else c ∣ if e then c else AH∣ while e do AH (ToyH attacks)
I. Compiler from ToyA to ToyH
The compiler from ToyA to ToyH simply calls
get_info on the ToyA program:
PT ↓x,y ≜ (x , y) ∶= get_info(PT)
UT ↓ ≜ UT
CT ↓x,y ≜ (x , y) ∶= get_info(CT[◻])
Since the compiled code simply executes the ToyA
source code, it is correct for whole programs.
J. Side-channel timing attack with ToyH
We implement the side-channel attack in Section III-C
in the PLT Redex model (the program findpass in
toyh.rkt), which illustrates how to discover a pass-
word in a linear number of calls to a password checker.
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